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Public Issues Committee 
Auckland District Law Society 
Discussion Paper 
 
FISHING AND JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
 
 
 
Introduction 
1. The role of the courts, and the extent to which judges assume an activist 
approach to their role, are matters of occasional public debate.1 In a Family 
Law Journal editorial on the subject,2 Principal Family Court Judge Peter 
Boshier referred to a paper he had presented to the 1998 Family Law 
Conference.3 It had received publicity, especially as it amounted to judge-
initiated debate on the law. Calling for creative interpretation of matrimonial 
property legislation, he said, “This will of course involve social policy issues. 
After all, what would the public rather have: a statute firmly set in the social 
mores of the 1970s or a statute that lives and evolves with our society? Law 
does not exist in a vacuum, but is an evolutionary process. Development of the 
law is dependent on counsel being prepared to push boundaries, and challenge 
judges to find ways to flesh the bones of the Act and do justice to all parties.” 
(pp.58-9) 
2. Socially active law-making by the courts is not of course confined to the 
family law field. The “Lands case” (New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney 
General [1987] 1 NZLR 641 (HC and CA)) was an historic court case, in that 
it was the first to attempt to distill some principles out of the Treaty of 
Waitangi. But it was also an example of judicial activism: the Court, in 
discussing the obligations of the Crown towards Maori, spoke of “utmost good 
faith”, duties “analogous to fiduciary duties”, “active protection”, “fullest 
                                                 
1  Paul O. Carrese, The Cloaking of Power: Montesquieu, Blackstone, and the Rise 
of Judicial Activism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003); Kenneth M. 
Holland (ed.), Judicial Activism in Comparative Perspective (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1991); Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1988). From early 1980s the Court of Appeal of New Zealand 
was especially active. See Taggart, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in 
the 1980s (1986). Note that the debate about activism extends to civil law 
countries. For a comment on the position in the Netherlands see M. de Werd 
and R. de Winter, “Judicial Activism in the Netherlands: Who Cares?” in B. 
Bakker et al (eds.), Judicial Control – Comparative Essays on Judicial Review 
(1996), 8. 
2  Peter Boshier “Editorial: Judicial activism and law reform” (September 1999) 
Butterworths Family Law Journal 51-52. 
3  Peter Boshier, “Developments in Matrimonial Property Law” (1998) Family 
Law Conference, 31st August-2nd September 1998, Christchurch, New Zealand 
Law Society 51-69. 
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extent practicable”, “infinitely more than a formality”, and “insist that it be 
honoured.” The result was the judicial creation of a range of overarching 
Treaty principles, since widely adopted by Parliament, in the courts and in 
government policy. 
3. Judicial activism isn’t necessarily a bad thing. In a recent chapter Professor 
Bruce Harris examined judicial creativity in New Zealand’s appellate courts.4 
He argues that judicial creativity is a natural and vital part of how the three 
branches of government work together to provide a single comprehensive 
system. The selection of appellate decisions discussed in the chapter displays 
the range of judicial creativity and restraint in the New Zealand jurisdiction. 
Both an appreciation of the degree of creativity which the system of 
government expects of the courts and the ongoing confidence the community 
maintains in the courts, suggest that the New Zealand appellate courts – 
notwithstanding the strident concerns of a small group of business and 
academic commentators – are perceived to be maintaining an appropriate 
balance between creativity and restraint. 
4. However, from time to time judgments come from the courts, especially the 
appellate courts, that raise questions about the appropriate boundaries of 
activism; where is it appropriate for the courts to be creative, and when should 
they leave the matter to Parliament? 
5. One recent case, which may be seen as an example which illustrates this, is the 
Supreme Court decision in New Zealand Recreational Fishing Council Inc v 
Sanford Ltd.5 The New Zealand Big Game Fishing Council Inc and the New 
Zealand Recreational Fishing Council Inc were the appellants in an appeal 
from the decision of the Court of Appeal.6 The majority and minority 
judgments of the Court gave the Minister of Fisheries wide and narrow 
discretion respectively. The former may be seen as being more activist, though 
ultimately judicial decisions are inherently liable to criticism on various 
grounds. 
 
Majority Decision – Blanchard, Tipping, McGrath and Wilson JJ, minority – 
Elias CJ 
6. The judgment of the Supreme Court was delivered on 28 May 2009. The 
majority decision was given by McGrath J. The dissenting judgment was 
given by Elias CJ. The former may be seen as wider, the latter as narrower, in 
scope. Although on one level this could be regarded as a distinction based on 
technical interpretation of the Fisheries Act 1996, it is also possible to see it as 
indicative of a greater and lesser degree of judicial activism. 
 
Significant difference between majority and minority decisions 
                                                 
4  Bruce Harris, “Judicial Activism in New Zealand’s Appellate Courts” in Brice 
Dickson(ed.), Judicial Activism in Common Law Supreme Courts (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007) 273-322. 
5  [2009] NZSC 54; SC 40/2008. 
6   CA163/07 [2008 NZCA 160, dated 11 June 2008]. 
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7. The significant difference between the majority and minority decisions relates 
to both the approach to, and the extent and limitations of, Ministerial 
discretion in making decisions under ss 20 and 21 of the Fisheries Act 1996 
(“the Act”), and how those decisions fit in to the scheme of the Act as a whole. 
8. In the majority view ss 20 and 21 were seen as conferring a wide discretion on 
the Minister to fully allocate or apportion the total allowable catch (TAC) 
among the commercial and non-commercial (recreational and Maori 
customary). By contrast, the Chief Justice viewed s 21, in particular, as 
requiring the Minister to first deduct from the TAC mortality to the fishery 
caused by non-commercial fishing and all other mortality caused by fishing to 
make sure that the TAC is not exceeded, and then to set the total allowable 
commercial catch between zero and the balance of the TAC. The Chief Justice 
held that this was not “a discretion to allocate the proportion of the TAC he 
thinks appropriate for non-commercial interests.” [21] 
 
Majority decision 
9. The majority of the Court (“the majority”) held that the Minister in making the 
decisions under ss 20 and 21 of “allowing for” non-commercial fishing 
interests and all other mortality under s 21(1), and setting the TACC under s 
20, has a wide discretion so long as the decisions are “reasonable in all the 
circumstances” bearing in mind the limited resource in which there are other 
interests [61]. In that regard, the Minister can adopt catch history so long as 
catch history provides a reasonable basis for assessments of allocations. [64] 
The same applies to the TACC although it may be reasonable for this to be set 
at [61], [65]. 
10. Those decisions, according to the majority, effectively involve “allocations” of 
the TAC which is fully apportioned among competing commercial and non-
commercial interests whilst recognising that the TACC may be set at zero [41] 
and [61]. 
11. In addition, whilst holding that in setting the TACC the Minister must have 
regard the TAC, and allow for mortality to the stock caused by both non-
commercial (recreational and Maori customary) and all other mortality (illegal 
fishing) [48], crucially the “utilisation whilst ensuring sustainability” purpose 
of the Act contained in s 8 provided only “contextual guidance” [54], [60] as 
to the nature of “recreational interests. That is ” interests in the ‘utilisation” of 
fisheries by fishing to enable them to provide for their social, economic and 
cultural wellbeing [54] but different to commercial fishing interest 
entitlements [55].  
12. Also, in recognising that the ‘allocation for recreational interests” could be nil 
[55, footnote 28], the so-called “allowance ... represents what the Minister 
considers recreational interests should be able to catch but also all they will be 
able to catch.” [56]  
13. More particularly, the majority rejected the argument that s 8 has any greater 
part to play in the Minister’s decisions under ss 20 and 21 other than that the 
Minister must “promote the policy and objects of the Act” (Unison), and “bear 
in mind and conform with the purposes of the (Act)” (Westhaven Shellfish) 
[59]. 
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Minority decision 
14. The majority decision is to be contrasted with the judgment of the Chief 
Justice. In a more narrowly reasoned (or less activist) judgment, the Chief 
Justice disagreed with the majority approach that ss 20 and the 21 procedure 
“is a mechanism for allocating the fish stock within the TAC between 
commercial and non-commercial interests” in respect of which “ the Minister 
quantifies ‘an allowance’ for recreational fishing interests under s 21 in 
arriving at the TACC… under s 20.” In the Chief Justice’s opinion “ss 20 and 
21 set up a mechanism for deciding what stock should be made available to 
recreational fishers”  “is misconceived.” [4] 
15. In further disagreeing with the majority view, the Chief Justice held that the 
only discretion the Minister has when he or she makes decisions under ss 20 
and 21, is at what stock level to set the TACC, namely, between zero and the 
balance of the TAC. This is after allowing for mortality caused by non-
commercial (recreational and Maori customary) fishing, and all other mortality 
caused by fishing [32] being an “estimate of actual loss, rather than what 
should (as held by the majority) be lost,” and “not a policy decision” [26]. 
16. Importantly, and contrary to the majority, the Chief Justice held that:  
a. a TACC may be set at less than the difference between the TAC and 
non-commercial mortality allowed for under s 21(1) being a 
discretionary determination based on the best available information 
“acting within the purpose and principles of the Act.” [22], [31], [32]  
b. it is open to the Minister to be conservative in setting the TACC where 
the stock, in respect of which there are social and cultural values, is 
under pressure, and that “s 20 is not the vehicle for adjusting access 
between recreational and Maori interests on the one hand, and 
commercial fishers on the other” the control of recreational fishing to 
be found in regulations. [32] 
c. “the s 20 determination must be in accordance with the policies and 
principles (ss 8 and 9) of the Act and taken after consultation with the 
relevant interests.” [ 32] 
17. In finding that s 21(1) is concerned with ascertaining what is available for the 
TACC, the Chief Justice held that a determination under s 20 means that the 
Minister must consider the different objects of the Act and take into account 
the views of those interests. [30] 
 
What the decision meant for noncommercial fishers? 
18. The decision meant the continuation of the status quo by the Ministry of 
Fisheries, and an “allocation” by the Minister of Fisheries, following a 
“proportional” or “apportionment” approach, by effectively treating non-
commercial fishing interests as non-commercial fishing quota alongside 
commercial quota (Part 4 of the Act). 
19. This follows from the confirmation by the majority of the Court of Appeal 
“broad brush” approach namely, “it is for the Minister to decide the basis on 
which decisions to set the commercial catch are taken” and that “in making 
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decisions under s 21 where the Minister is properly informed and acting within 
the statutory framework described is satisfied that “catch history …provides a 
reasonable basis for assessments of allocations” then “it is open to the Minister 
to take that approach.”[64] 
20. By contrast the Chief Justice’s minority judgment contains focused on the 
Chief Justice’s view of the scheme of the Act. First, setting the TAC decision, 
then setting the TACC decisions preceded by the process of “allowing for,” 
that is, deducting non-commercial fishing mortality and all other mortality, 
and related consultation; then the way in which the decisions under ss 20 and 
21 in particular must be made.  
21. The Chief Justice referred to a lower TAC, and perhaps a lower TACC in a 
particular fishery either depleted or “under pressure” to enable abundance and 
as a consequence larger fish available for non-commercial fishing interests 
previously not able to be caught without significantly increased non-
commercial fishing effort. 
 
Judicial activism and judicial review 
 
22. The Canadian judiciary provides probably the best example in the common 
law world of judicial activism.7 But New Zealand has not been far behind, 
with superior judges especially being determined to reflect contemporary 
thinks, or keep abreast of the times.8 The growth of judicial review in the 
course of the late 20th century and into the early part of this century has 
extended the scope of judicial activism.  
23. It has been said that it is the anti-majoritarianism implicit in judicial activism 
that is its most serious fault.9 Judge-made law lacks the legitimacy of law 
made by representative assemblies such as Parliament. The broad-brush, rather 
than closely analytical approach risks the courts moving too far into 
policymaking of a loose type, uninhibited both by political accountability and 
by tightly-binding precedent. This makes the courts more of a power unto 
themselves than has hitherto been the case. 
 
Conclusions 
24. Though the Supreme Court decision in New Zealand Recreational Fishing 
Council Inc v Sanford Ltd10 may not be in the same league of Lord Cooke of 
Thorndon’s judgment in New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney General,11 it 
can nonetheless be seen as an example of judicial activism. Lord Cooke, the 
                                                 
7  M. Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada 
(Wall & Thompson, Toronto, 1989). 
8  John Smellie, “Fornalism, Fairness and Efficiency: Civil Adjudication in New 
Zealand” (1996) New Zealand Law Review 254-274 (part 2). 
9  James Allan, “The Rise of Judicial Activism in New Zealand” (1997) 4(4) 
Agenda 465-474, 471.  
10  [2009] NZSC 54; SC 40/2008. 
11  [1987] 1 NZLR 641 (HC & CA). 
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Father of Judicial Activism in New Zealand, led the Court of Appeal in a more 
activist direction. The new Supreme Court may lack the self-imposed public 
policy restraint of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and it is freer 
to develop the law in accordance with social and political considerations. The 
effect will potentially be a more activist final appellate court. This could 
expose the courts to criticism. 
25. The broad-brush approach taken by the appellate courts, coupled with the 
apparently greater difficulty of being heard (notwithstanding the rationale of 
the establishment of the Supreme Court to increase public access to justice), 
adds to the difficulties facing a litigant. Though Lord Cooke may be gone, 
there is no reason to suppose that another Cooke will not emerge to challenge 
the status quo, and even throw into doubt the intention of Parliament.  
26. The question of the immunity of judges from political criticism – if such an 
immunity exists – has recently been raised in New Zealand by a number of 
political events. There was some criticism of judges and of elements of the 
judiciary during the debate on the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council – 
including claims that the Privy Council was “out-of touch”, or that the Court 
of Appeal was activist or less capable than it should be when dealing with 
commercial appeals. In an address to the Legal Research Foundation, the then 
Solicitor-General, Terence Arnold, QC, called for this criticism to end, for it 
undermined the judiciary as a whole.12 
27. The Court of Appeal ruling which led to acrimony between the Government 
and Maori over the foreshore and seabed moved the Government to break with 
convention by openly criticising the courts. More recently, the former Deputy 
Prime Minister, Dr the Hon Michael Cullen, suggested that the courts were 
challenging the supremacy of Parliament.13 Whether this was motivated by the 
Court of Appeal decision, or whether it had a more general basis, it was a 
significant statement. These events raise serious questions about the nature of 
criticism of judges and the judiciary. More importantly, these raise questions 
about the respective roles of Parliament and the courts in New Zealand.  
28. Whenever the courts make high profile decisions there is the potential for 
criticism. Sometimes this may be justified, but ultimately much depends upon 
the court’s ability to steer between Charybdis and Scylla; of avoiding 
expressing political views, and becoming a mere mouthpiece for platitudes, a 
dry narrator of unchanging black letter law. 
                                                 
12  Terence Arnold, “Update on the Supreme Court”, Annual General Meeting, 
Legal Research Foundation Inc., Auckland, 7 August 2004. Text available at 
<http://www.Crownlaw.govt.nz/uploads/UpdateSC.PDF>. 
13  Hon Michael Cullen, “Human Rights and the Foreshore and Seabed”, Human 
Rights Commission Speakers Forum, Wellington, 1st June 2004. Available at 
<http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.cfm?DocumentID=19914>. See 
also Hon Michael Cullen, “Observations on the Role of Government” 
<http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.cfm?DocumentID=17678>.  
